

Climate Diplomacy and the Politics of Food Security in Africa's International Relations

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ABSTRACT

This chapter examines the concept of climate diplomacy in Africa's regional and global engagements, and their connection to food security. The study is an attempt that broadly covers bilateral and multilateral efforts and arrangements, agreements and their implementations, institutions and their policies at sub-regional, regional and global levels that revolve around climate change, climate diplomacy and politics of food security in Africa. Data obtained from primary and secondary sources were deployed to carry out the study with an analytical and narrative historical approach. This includes historical, descriptive and analytical approaches based on gathered evidence. The primary source for this research is based on field investigations conducted in the area and surrounding territories. Among other things, the data collection process includes semi-structured interviews with individuals. The research also uses historical documents from previous research conducted on issues of climate change, climate diplomacy and food security, in addition to documentary data taken from newspaper accounts and verbal reports.

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INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the concept of climate diplomacy in Africa's regional and global engagements, and their connection to food security. The study is an attempt that broadly covers bilateral and multilateral efforts and arrangements, agreements and their implementations, institutions and their policies at sub-regional, regional and global levels that revolve around climate change, climate diplomacy and politics of food security in Africa.

Climate Change and Climate Diplomacy in Africa: Brief Historical Background.

For the paper to meaningfully discuss the concept of climate diplomacy in Africa's regional and global engagements, and their connection to food security, there is the urgent need to give some historical background to issue which led to climate diplomacy in Africa. This is because the concept Climate Diplomacy, has a history of its own, without which one may not be able to understand any discourse around the concept.

Conceptual Clarification and History

Scholars have argued that there is no universal definition of climate diplomacy, However, The European Commission defines four strands of climate diplomacy at the political level: Committing to multilateralism in climate policy, particularly to the implementation of the Paris Agreement; Addressing implications of climate change on peace and security; Accelerating domestic action and raising global ambition; and enhancing international climate cooperation through advocacy and outreach.

It is in line with the above and a critical analysis of its application that it can be argued that this study concurs with the view of Climate Diplomacy Magazine (2011, 2018) which opines that climate diplomacy encompasses the use of diplomatic tools to support the ambition and functioning of the international climate change regime and to attenuate the negative impacts climate change risks pose for peace, stability and prosperity.

Expanding the definition further, the Magazine continued thus:

“Furthermore, climate diplomacy entails using the issue of climate change for furthering other foreign policy objectives such as confidence- and peace-building or strengthening multilateralism. Climate diplomacy calls for preparing appropriate risk assessment and risk management strategies at a global strategic level. Climate diplomacy also means prioritising climate action with partners worldwide – in diplomatic dialogues, public diplomacy and external policy instruments. This includes reaching out to partner countries bilaterally and making the case for more ambitious climate action. By taking cross-cutting issues into account, climate diplomacy addresses the security and stability implications of climate change. Early action on the security risks of climate change requires a strong network of partners, including representatives from civil society and the private sector. International environmental and climate diplomacy, bilateral environmental cooperation, as well as environmental policy can promote dialogue and confidence-building, thereby contributing to regional stability”.

Taking this as a summary of Climate Diplomacy, it is thus clear that there are issues that are closely related to this Climate Diplomacy.

When people talk about climate change or the greenhouse effect, they're usually referring to the natural process of plant life undergoing a transformation that allows for life on Earth, namely the warming impact. Though deforestation accounts for 17.4% of emissions and agriculture for 13.5%, the food and agricultural sectors together account for more than 30% of yearly greenhouse gas emissions, which have a negative impact on Earth's climate and lead to global warming. In the forestry community, there is a school of thought that holds that human-caused increases in greenhouse gas emissions can alter global climate by increasing the amount of heat reflected back to Earth from the atmosphere. Put simply, the gaseous emissions from forest trees, particularly older ones, as well as those from fires, have the potential to worsen the already unfavourable atmospheric conditions, making living more challenging for humans (Aletan A., Martins O. and Idowu O. A. 2011), Akubor 2014).

Related to the above is the problem of gas flaring, which adds sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and carcinogenic substances like benazapyrene, dioxin, benzene, and toluene to the climate crisis by increasing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. The majority of the carbon dioxide emissions in Sub-Saharan Africa come from coal-fired power plants and gas flaring. Gas flaring must end immediately if the world's

nations are serious about taking action to prevent climate change. According to Akubor (2012), it has had a significant role in the degradation of the human environment.

Table I: Gas Flaring (billion Cubic Metres) in Sub-Sahara Africa (Baumuller, 2011, Akubor 2012)

S/no	Country/year	1995	2000	2005	2010
1	Angola	4.15	5.94	4.72	4.08
2.	Cameroun	1.15	1.19	0.97	0.92
3.	Chad	0.00	0.00	0.97	0.92
4.	Congo	1.08	2.02	1.79	1.88
5.	Cote d'Ivoire	0.06	0.09	0.04	0.09
6.	DRC	0.53	0.43	0.44	0.00
7.	Eq. Guinea	0.61	1.21	1.36	0.39
8.	Ghana	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.2
9.	Gabon	2.15	2.54	2.36	1.68
10.	Nigeria	27.09	27.19	21.25	15.18
11.	South Africa	0.06	0.13	0.14	0.10
12.	Global	154.97	164.90	171.65	133.90

The continent's efforts to address gas flaring, which contributes to climate change and the need to save the globe, have been hindered by corruption and politicisation. Within five years after starting operations, the Nigerian government mandated that oil firms establish facilities to use associated gas, marking the first effort to curb gas flaring in the country. The corporations failed to do this, and they then used their influence over the government to move the deadline to 1979, a new deadline that was also disregarded. The zero flaring date was once again moved to 1984, and any enterprise that fails to reach the deadline is required to pay a fee. Also, in 1979, No.9, the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act was passed, which mandated that all oil companies doing business in the nation must have comprehensive plans for gas utilisation and a zero flare guarantee in place by January 1, 1984, unless the Minister granted them an individual exemption. By 1983, the oil multinationals had already reasoned once again that fulfilling the deadline in 1984 was not conceivable. As a result of pressure from multinational corporations, the government later shifted the deadline whichever it pleased. None of these changes were based on legislation but on presidential orders. As a result of domestic and foreign pressure, the federal government has renewed its commitment to end gas flaring by January 1, 2008. Not long after that, on December 17th, 2007, an additional date was announced; this time, zero flaring would be implemented on December 31st, 2008. Even though it's 2012, nearly four years later, the nation still flaring petrol at an alarming rate (Food Agricultural Organization, 2007, Lenten Campaign, 2011, Akubor, 2014). Furthermore The continent's efforts to address gas flaring, which contributes to climate change and the need to save the globe, have been hindered by corruption and politicisation. Within five years after starting operations, the Nigerian government mandated that oil firms establish facilities to use associated gas, marking the first effort to curb gas flaring in the country. The corporations failed to do this, and they then used their influence over the government to move the deadline to 1979, a new deadline that was also disregarded. The zero flaring date was once again moved to 1984, and any enterprise that fails to reach the deadline is required to pay a fee. Also, in 1979, No.9, the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act was passed, which mandated that all oil companies doing business in the nation must have comprehensive plans for gas utilisation and a zero flare guarantee in place by January 1, 1984, unless the Minister granted them an individual exemption. By 1983, the oil multinationals had already reasoned once again that fulfilling the deadline in 1984 was not conceivable. As a result of pressure from multinational corporations, the government later shifted the deadline whichever it pleased. None of these changes were based on legislation but on presidential orders. As a result of domestic and foreign pressure, the

federal government has renewed its commitment to end gas flaring by January 1, 2008. Not long after that, on December 17th, 2007, an additional date was announced; this time, zero flaring would be implemented on December 31st, 2008. Even though it's 2012, nearly four years later, the nation still flaring petrol at an alarming rate (Food Agricultural Organization, 2007, Lenten Campaign, 2011, Akubor, 2014).

Climate Change and the African Continent: A Brief Historical Background

Scholars (Smith, 1976, Kwanashie et al, 1987, Akubor, 2017, Akubor and Akubor 2021) have argued that although Climate Change is not new as far as the history of the Africa Continent is concerned, however, the situation in the last two decades is alarming and could constitute a threat to agricultural production, food security and water security. Specifically, it has been noted that as a result, there will be negative consequences on people's lives and sustainable development in Africa.

Historicizing the above, Akubor (2017) specifically noted available evidence indicates that the impact of climate change as far as the African continent is concerned has been no from historic time (Smith A, 1971, 1976, Kwanashie G, 1987). This is based on Archaeological evidence from over 1500 archaeological sites recorded in the Chad-North Cameroun area made it clear that climate change has since started impacting on desertification and impacting negatively on plant species composition in the West African sub region (with specific reference Northeastern Nigeria upto the the Lake Chad region). In a more graphic manner, Akubor 2017 (citing Smith A, 1971, 1976, Connah G, 1983, Usman, Y.B, 1983 and Kwanashie G, 1987), wrote:

“Available archaeological facts and historical documents have argued that the area understudy, during the last 20,000 years or so, though free from tectonic movements, has been subject to sensational climate changes, which in turn have radically modified the conditions of both the human, flora and fauna configuration of the region. Historians have gone on to posit that (with specific reference to the eastern zone), prior to the beginning of the climate change, a large percentage of the area was almost entirely occupied by a large lake, the Mega Chad. The size of this great sheet of water is argued to have been the size of the Caspian Sea, stretching as far south west as modern Bama and Gashua (Nigeria) and in the north east to the foothills of the Tibesti. The shore land of this Mega Chad especially the northern part provided a suitable habitat for the hunters and food gatherers of Old Stone Age hillmen of Central Nigeria, a condition which persisted which continued until about 5,000 years ago”.

In a more specific term, Kwanashie G et al (1987), wrote:

“Then after about 7,000 B.P., dramatic changes in climate appear to have begun in this region: changes which brought about not only a substantial alteration in the distribution of surface water, but also a series of revolutionary modification in the fauna and flora and consequently the conditions of human life. This process has continued down to recent time and has led to what scholars have described as Climigration”.

Currently, the Lake Chad which was once the sixth largest in the world with a surface area of the 26,000 square kilometres in 1963; has now contracted to less than 1,500 square kilometres (Abhijit , et al 2021). It has been argued that a combination of factors notably reduction of precipitation and population pressures have been largely responsible for the 90 per cent shrinkage of the lake (The European Space Agency, 2019). Historically, Lake Chad has been a major source of drinking water for the peoples of the region, as well as for irrigation, livestock, fishing and other economic activity. The rapid depletion of the quantity of water and heightened competition for it have ultimately led to vicious conflicts, often between farmers and pastoralists (Isobel & Sigrid, 2014)

According to Ediang et al. (nd), subsequent events involved extensive Climigration. The term "climigration" has been used to characterise this form of migration. When a community dies out, its members leave. Permanent migration is necessary to safeguard humans from climate-related disasters, and this is the only sustainable option. The fact that climate events are ongoing and have a recurrent effect on the public is a critical component. Infrastructure and endanger public safety, which might lead to casualties. Desiccation and climigration are processes that defy detailed description because they involve climatic fluctuations (Ediang , A et al).

The Continent of Africa and Climate Change.

Extant studies have argued that as far as achieving the Sustainable Development Goals is concerned in Africa, Climate change represents a major threat. This position is well spelt out in the 2018, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report which clearly highlighted the grave consequences of a temperature increase above 1.5°C, especially for the continent. This is rather unfortunate, considering the fact that despite Africa's low contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, she remains the most vulnerable continent. In a simpler term, Africa is the most vulnerable continent to climate change impacts under all climate scenarios above 1.5 degrees Celsius. According to African Development Bank Group (2018, 2024)

“Despite having contributed the least to global warming and having the lowest emissions, Africa faces exponential collateral damage, posing systemic risks to its economies, infrastructure investments, water and food systems, public health, agriculture, and livelihoods, threatening to undo its modest development gains and slip into higher levels of extreme poverty. The following factors contribute to Africa's vulnerability: Sub-Saharan Africa has 95% of rain-fed agriculture globally; A large share of agriculture in GDP and employment adds to vulnerability, as do other weather-sensitive activities, such as herding and fishing, leading to income losses and increased food insecurity; Seven of the 10 countries that are most vulnerable to climate change are in Africa. In 2015, four African countries ranked among the 10 countries most affected: Mozambique (1st), Malawi (3rd), Ghana and Madagascar (joint 8th position)”

Giving statistical representations, the African Development Bank Group (2018, 2024) continues:

“From 2008 to 2011, drought caused economic losses equivalent to 3.9 percent of Djibouti's GDP per annum; WFP declared the floods in Mozambique a Level-3 emergency, on a par with Yemen and Syria”^[SEP] Ninety percent of the infrastructure was destroyed in Beira, Mozambique, the epicenter of the 2019 Cyclone Idai;. Beira is Mozambique's fourth-largest city, with important energy infrastructure investments and natural gas deposits off the coastline.;...UNEP-commissioned research estimates that the cost of adapting to climate change across Africa could reach \$50 billion a year by 2050, if the global temperature increase is kept within 2°C above preindustrial levels.;...Africa will need investments of over \$3 trillion in mitigation and adaptation by 2030 in order to implement its NDCs”

The impact of the above on the socioeconomic development of the Continent is that (even with the available natural and mineral resources), rather than achieving their objectives of industrialization, countries within the continent have found themselves unable to overcome hitherto existing problems of internal capital accumulation, increasing power of multinational corporations, balance of payments crisis and mounting indebtedness. Generalised economic and political crisis ensued and were, so to speak, generated from the systemic inadequacies of their socioeconomic formations. It is the inadequacies (if not adequately tackled) that will lead the continent into another phase of Dependency (a process of stagnation and/or underdevelopment in the nations of the third world on the others.

Climate Change, Climate Diplomacy and Food Security.

One major area in which climate change has really affected the African Continent is in the area of Food Security. Food Security as applied here is the state of people having access to good and safe food for healthy living. FAO (1996) argued that food security is the situation when all people at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food for healthy and active life. One of the greatest threats to achieving this has been the issue of Climate Change, especially in the case of Africa (NMets, 2012:83).

The preceding is proven by the fact that it has been contended from the beginning that the effects of climate change will permeate every aspect of human existence and society, particularly the production that relies on land and water bodies. According to Akubor (2014, 2025), some 200 million people, mostly engaged in farming, fishing, and aquaculture, would be impacted by climate change. This number does not even include the creatures and plants that inhabit the world's oceans, seas, lakes, and rivers. This source claims that fish populations would decline and that certain fish species may relocate to regions with less fishing pressure. As a result, many fishing villages will find it more challenging to sustain themselves economically or to provide their families with seafood. Rising sea levels pose a threat to coastal towns as well, forcing them to relocate and adapt to new ways of life. There will be new pests and illnesses that can only thrive in certain climates, and these will affect people, plants, animals, and water resources. Human health, food safety, and food security

may face new threats as a result of this. Nearly 150,000 people lose their lives each year as a direct result of climate change, according to the World Health Organization (quoted in Oyegbile 2007). According to the research, this would mostly impact children in underdeveloped countries and might include everything from malaria to hunger. Also, if global warming is not halted by 2020, the number of fatalities will nearly quadruple due to the rate of change in various regions of the planet. Describing the situation of disaster then associated with Climate Change, Akubor 2014 wrote:

“Although the environment has from time immemorial been under constant threat, but the recent trend of events indicates that the human society is in for probably the worst. There have been cases of floods, hurricanes and other natural disaster ravaging different parts of the world with devastating effects. At the international level, there was the devastating tsunami in December (26), 2004, that swept through Asia claiming lives and properties. In Indonesia alone over 130,000 people, over 500,000 were rendered homeless, while over 37,000 others were declared missing; Sri Lanka lost more than 31,000 lives, while 100,000 homes were damaged, alongside their crops and fishing boats. This singular act alone rendered more than 400,000 people jobless.”

The communities who produce food are the ones that suffer the most as a result of all this. This is because, in most instances, agricultural land was lost as a result of the pressures exerted on land resources by climate change. Example: in sub-Saharan African countries, desertification has led to climate change-related conflicts, which in turn have displaced countless people from their homes and livelihoods, killed thousands of people, and compelled many more to leave their homeland. According to Lenshie E et al. (2020), the state of Benue in central Nigeria had the highest number of herder-farmer conflicts and fatalities as of 2020. There were 2,827 deaths and 450 incidents in Nigeria over the same time period. Records from other regions reveal the same, therefore it's not only a West African phenomenon. During the same time period, there were 13 incidents in the Central African Republic, killing 218 people, whilst Mali had just 2 incidents, killing 20 people. The economic, social, and political repercussions of herder-farmer confrontations have been catastrophic, regardless of their severity. According to the African Centre for Strategic Studies, desertification is a serious and growing concern for the Sahel region's population. More than 12.8 million people in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia are facing food insecurity, disease outbreak susceptibility, clandestine conflict, and the rise of religious extremist groups that are undermining and pillaging the state's authority as a result of desertification.

Climate Diplomacy and Food Security: Establishing the Nexus

The problem has escalated to such a degree in Africa that food insecurity has plunged the region into utter disarray. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the African Union Commission (AUC), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and the World Food Programme (WFP) report that Africa is facing an unparalleled food catastrophe. The document, Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition - Statistics and Trends 2023, emphasises concerning data on food insecurity and malnutrition, which accentuates the immediate necessity for extensive intervention. Approximately 282 million individuals in Africa, including almost 20 percent of the populace, experience undernourishment, marking an increase of 57 million since the onset of the COVID-19 epidemic. Over a billion individuals lack the financial means to maintain a nutritious diet. Approximately 30 percent of children have stunting due to nutritional deficiencies. Africa is not on course to achieve the food security and nutrition objectives of the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, nor the Malabo goals of eradicating hunger and all types of malnutrition by 2025. The decline in food security and the stagnation in meeting WHO global nutrition objectives need that nations intensify their endeavours to realise a hunger-free and malnutrition-free world by 2030. This emerged during the UN climate change meeting COP28, emphasising the crucial nexus between climate issues and food scarcity in Africa. Notwithstanding significant endeavours by governments and collaborators, food insecurity is exacerbating in West and Central Africa, with projections indicating that the number of individuals facing hunger will soar to an alarming 49.5 million from June to August 2024 – a four percent rise relative to 2023, as per a regional food security assessment published today. The trend is particularly concerning in coastal nations, where an increasing percentage of women, men, and children are experiencing severe hunger (IPC/CH stages 3 or above). Experts predict that this tendency would attain 6.2 million during the hunger gap from June to August 2024, marking a 16 percent rise compared to the figures from 2023. The November 2023 Cadre Harmonisé assessment forecasts that grain and tuber yields across the region would be marginally higher than both the levels of 2022 and the 5-year mean, attributed to enhanced rainfall in 2023.

It has been said that the severe hunger in West and Central Africa is predominantly fuelled by conflicts associated with climate change, resulting in the forcible displacement of millions from their residences and agricultural lands. The direct consequence of this (effects of the climate catastrophe) is escalating costs of food and gasoline. Forecasts indicate that, given the prevailing circumstances, the prices of staple foods will persistently exceed the five-year average, especially for rice, corn, millet, sorghum, cassava, and vegetable oil, notwithstanding seasonal reductions in local commodity prices relative to late 2022 and 2023. The World Food Program 2023 Report provides a more lucid understanding of the circumstances, with a portion stating the following. Acute hunger in West and Central Africa is mostly caused by violence, which has forcefully uprooted millions from their residences and agricultural lands, the repercussions of the climate catastrophe, and elevated food and fuel costs. The costs of staple foods continue to exceed the five-year average, especially for rice, corn, millet, sorghum, cassava and vegetable oil, even if there have been seasonal reductions in local commodity prices relative to the previous year.

Acute hunger remains at record levels in the region, yet funding needed to respond is not keeping a pace; this is forcing WFP to scale back lifesaving assistance for those most affected in their hour of greatest need; ...Insufficient funding means the moderately hungry will be forced to skip meals and consume less nutritious food, putting them at risk of falling back into crisis or emergency phases, perpetuating the cycle of hunger and malnutrition. We need to break this circle by tackling the root causes of hunger and by building the resilience of families in West Africa. The nutritional situation remains worrying, particularly in the Sahel, where emergency levels of child wasting were reached and surpassed in several countries this year, notably in parts of Mali, north-west Nigeria and Burkina Faso. This was due to fragile food systems which do not deliver the specific nutritional needs of women and children; limited access to basic social services; and poor care and hygiene practices.

Emphasizing the impact of this on family nutrition with specific focus on children, the document reads further thus:

“More than 2 out of 3 households in West and Central Africa cannot afford healthy diets. And 8 out of 10 children aged 6-23 months do not consume the minimum number of food groups they need for optimal growth and development. In the year up to the end of October 2023, 1.9 million children under five years were admitted for treatment of severe wasting across nine Sahel countries, representing a 20 percent increase as compared to the same period in 2022. Children in West and Central Africa have a right to nutritious, safe, affordable and sustainable diets.”

The aforementioned scenario is comprehensible when seen in the context of the deteriorating conditions on the continent. The World Food Programme (2023) reports that the expense of a daily nutritious diet in central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) exceeds the daily minimum wage in the area by 110 percent, with an increasing number of households depending on local markets for their food, including in rural locales. The circumstances in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger closely resemble those in Nigeria, particularly in the northern regions adjacent to the Lake Chad vicinity. As reported by Medecins Sans Frontieres, some 37,500 individuals lost their lives in the war surrounding the Lake Chad area from May 2011 to July 2020. The OCHA Report from September 2018 categorised the humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad area as one of the most critical globally, with women and children as the primary victims. Extended displacement, instability, pillaging, and devastation have compelled the shutdown of marketplaces, while security protocols have undermined livelihoods. Approximately 2.4 million individuals continue to be uprooted due to the fighting. Out of that total, 1.8 million reside solely in northeast Nigeria. Whole villages have been uprooted, and citizens persistently endure recurrent violations and abuses of their rights. In numerous villages, health facilities, educational institutions, and other infrastructures have been ravaged by the conflict. International humanitarian organisations indicate that a minimum of five million individuals are deemed severely food insecure and require ongoing and intensified food and livelihood support

In Kenya, the circumstances are somewhat analogous, and thus, the region and its inhabitants are also susceptible to similar perils (climate threats encompass droughts and floods, since precipitation is expected to grow more severe and erratic). It has been determined that Kenya is highly susceptible to the effects of climate change. Climate models forecast an increase in temperatures ranging from 0.5 to 2 °C. In the informal urban areas of Nairobi, the urban heat island phenomenon exacerbates the issue by generating higher ambient temperatures. This results from residential building materials, inadequate airflow, limited greenery, and insufficient access to electricity and other amenities. It has been proposed that, for the purpose of comparative

evaluation, the expense of a nutritious food in Africa is comparable to that in the USA, even though the latter's GDP exceeds that of the African area by almost 35 times.

Politics of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation.

Studies indicate that in light of the alarming repercussions of Climate Change, numerous tools and strategies for mitigation and adaptation, including the Green Funds Reduced Emission from Forest, Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), have been formulated to safeguard the interests of developing nations globally. Consequently, it is unsurprising that the CDM was among the adaptable mechanisms established by the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM is a project-oriented framework designed to enable Annex 1 nations to fulfil their carbon reduction obligations by financing emission mitigation initiatives in non-Annex 1 countries. However, the CDM initiative has been biased towards select nations such as China, Brazil, and India. A limited number of CDM projects that received approval by 2012 were allocated to Africa. The reality is that the CDM board is mostly influenced by industrialised nations, resulting in project screening protocols that are both stringent and require extensive, costly paperwork and procedures. CDM necessitates substantial administrative and transactional expenses, coupled with minimal financial incentives and complex reporting procedures. As a result, African nations who require CDM Projects the most because to their heightened susceptibility to climate change impacts ultimately get the least from the global warming mitigation framework. The affluent nations globally have committed to increasing Green Climate financing. The objective in the early 2000s was first to provide a minimum of 30 billion US dollars per year from 2010 to 2012, then increasing to 100 billion US dollars from 2020 to assist poor nations in mitigating the effects of climate change. In many instances, it has been noted that these commitments lack legal enforceability, and the majority of nations typically fail to uphold them. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that by 2009, around 4730 CDM projects have been sanctioned for implementation worldwide. An analysis of the distribution revealed that Asia possessed the predominant portion of 3700 projects. Latin America and the Caribbean received 820, while Africa was designated 210. In a comparable manner, the distribution trend in Africa indicated that South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, and Morocco were predominant in the CDM initiative, although Nigeria officially recorded just five projects (Nigerian Meteorological Society (NMets, 2012:64-5). Consequently, it is very appropriate for Africa to engage in the politics of Climate Diplomacy if it aims to get an equitable portion of the initiatives.

Climate Diplomacy: The Way of Foreign Aid and International Trade

The discussions thus far indicate that Climate Change is a genuine concern that will persist in wreaking havoc on the world, particularly on the African continent, unless it is effectively addressed. According to academics, this can be accomplished via Climate Diplomacy. This aligns with the understanding that climate diplomacy involves leveraging climate change to further additional foreign policy goals, including confidence-building, peace initiatives, and the enhancement of multilateralism. This also involves formulating suitable risk assessment and management strategies on a global strategic scale, through diplomatic discussions, public diplomacy, and external policy tools, engaging with partner nations bilaterally to advocate for more ambitious climate initiatives.

Consistent with the aforementioned, it has been posited that Africa's fortitude in climate diplomacy is manifested in its pivotal contribution to the establishment of a funding mechanism for Loss and Damage, aimed at offering financial support to economically disadvantaged countries confronting the adverse effects of inevitable climate change challenges. Ababio K (2023) contended that Africa's productive participation, coupled with the Egyptian Presidency at COP 27, culminated in a significant resolution regarding Loss and Damage. In a more explicit manner, Ababio (2023) noted:

“Despite this success in Sharm El Sheikh, Loss and Damage will take centre stage in Dubai in anticipation of a decision towards operationalization of the Fund. An agreement on the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund which was adopted to a standing ovation on the opening day of the Dubai COP 28 represents a positive contribution by Africa to global climate governance. Africa will continue to engage the global community towards adequate capitalization of the Fund. Compared to other global issues that require a coordinated approach, climate diplomacy is the one area in which Africa seems to have performed creditably despite resource and other limitations. With improved coordination, increased resources, and streamlining of the key priority

issues such as energy transitions, financing, and adaptation within the climate negotiations Africa's influence on the global stage will become even more pronounced and effective."

Consistent with the aforementioned, the majority of African nations should persist in treating climate change as a paramount priority in both domestic and foreign policy, delineating its connections to various facets of national interest, including economic advancement and national security. Consequently, they must demonstrate an increasing dedication to collaborating with other countries and regions to propel worldwide climate initiatives.

The matter of International trade is intricately linked to Climate Diplomacy. Munge (2023) explicitly emphasised that a fundamental connection between climate policy and international relations is established through international accords and treaties. Referencing The Paris Agreement, Munge asserted that it is a vital worldwide accord aimed at restricting the increase in global temperatures to far below 2 degrees Celsius relative to pre-industrial benchmarks. It encompasses pledges from almost all nations globally to diminish emissions and bolster climate resilience (United Nations, 2015). These accords necessitate nations to partake in diplomatic discussions and collaboration, demonstrating the relationship between climate policy and global affairs. Munge continued thus:

"Climate policy also has significant geopolitical implications. Nations that are major greenhouse gas emitters must navigate international relations carefully to strike a balance between environmental commitments and their economic interests. This can lead to complex diplomatic negotiations and alliances, as well as competition over resources and technology transfer (Aykut & Foyer, 2016). International relations are influenced by the distribution of responsibilities and the power dynamics

among countries in the context of climate policy".

Climate Diplomacy and Investment

Sophie Dicker et al, (2023), opined that Investing in climate change adaptation and resilience can be an extremely cost-effective way of protecting communities, livelihoods and businesses, and promoting economic development and growth. This is based on their analysis which argued thus:

"Adaptation to and resilience against the impacts of climate change are urgent and growing priorities around the world as levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere continue to increase. Impacts such as sea level rise and changes in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, including heavy rainfall, tropical storms and heatwaves, are a threat to lives and livelihoods around the world. These impacts undermine economic development and efforts to eliminate poverty and raise living standards. Indeed, efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals are being harmed by climate change impacts that are already occurring. It is the poorest people in every country who are usually most vulnerable and exposed to these impacts. And these impacts will continue to grow until global emissions of greenhouse gases are reduced effectively to [net] zero."

In view of the above the scholars gave the following suggestion in term of investment, which when taken into consideration could bring in meaningful change. Some of these includes:

- ❖ All countries should give higher priority to investments in adaptation and resilience, and integrate them with policies and decisions to promote the transition to an inclusive zero-carbon economy.
- ❖ Scale up the quantity of well-targeted finance available for climate change adaptation and resilience.
- ❖ Increase the effectiveness of multilateral and bilateral funding by working with recipients to ensure it is targeted on both established and innovative climate change adaptation processes.
- ❖ Decision-making frameworks for financing adaptation should recognise and value a diverse range of possible benefits that may result.
- ❖ Target investment towards adaptation processes that include a focus on natural, knowledge, human and social capital and seek to scale up successful models, such as those that enhance existing institutions or result in legislative change

CONCLUSION

So far the focus has been on climate diplomacy in Africa's regional and global engagements, and their connection to food security, which is clearly manifesting all over the world. In the case of Africa, the trend is alarming, devastating and must be tackled if the continent must survive. As it is currently Africa has a great role to play (some of which have already been embarked on). She must be able to reach out to other countries of the world through Climate Diplomacy. This is very necessary considering the fact that while there is increasing climate change related devastation, there is also the politic of who should pay for the emission of green gases between the industrialized (developed) countries and the poor developing countries of the world, and the future of Africa is caught in-between these two giants(Ajadike 2012). While the developing worlds are advancing the arguments that the industrialized countries owe them some debt and reparations for polluting the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolutions of the 1750s, the developed world on the other hand accepted to pay something but they are also quick to advance the argument (in their defense), that some emerging developing countries with large economies such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa are equally guilty of pollution resulting to climate change and climate change related disaster, and that the future emissions of greenhouse gases may be worst than whatever the developed countries have done because of poor environmental controls and weak abatement institutions and processes of the emerging economies of the world.. This is were Africans must remain united in climate diplomacy as to save her future.

In sum, the general argument and agreement revolves around the quest to invest meaningfully as a way to prevent child malnutrition happening anyway within the continent especially considering the dire situation currently. There is therefore the need (apart from individual efforts), to acquire the necessary funding to keep supporting government services for the early detection, treatment, and care of malnourished children to help them survive, recover, and go on to live healthy and productive lives with dignity.

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